Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME OF REPORT: 11 JUN 25 / 07:37 ZULU REPORTING PERIOD: 11 JUN 25 / 07:07 ZULU - 11 JUN 25 / 07:37 ZULU PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET / ORCON / NOFORN

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain:

• Eastern Ukraine (Kharkiv City/Oblast): Confirmed continued impact from night attacks with one wounded civilian in severe condition. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). This reinforces previous reports of persistent aerial pressure.
• Southern Ukraine (Mykolaiv, Kherson, Odesa Oblasts):
  • Mykolaiv City experienced an emergency power outage not linked to Russian shelling, with power gradually returning. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Kherson Oblast also experienced partial power outages, with power returning. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Odesa Oblast reported a night attack with no casualties according to DSNS, but previous reports indicate civilian damage. This new information highlights the varying impact assessments and the civilian nature of the targets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Colonelcassad (Russian milblogger) claims Russian Kh-101 cruise missiles were targeting Odesa Oblast, attempting to legitimize strikes as against "occupied" Russian territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for report, LOW for veracity).
• Russian Territory (Pskov Oblast): Reports of internet and mobile communication outages. This could indicate either Ukrainian deep strike activity affecting infrastructure or internal Russian technical issues/security measures. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).
• Russian Territory (Kursk Oblast): "Dnevnik Desantnika" (Russian milblogger) posts a tactical map with explosion icons near Tetkino and Popovo-Lezhachi, Kursk Oblast, indicating continued kinetic activity in border areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for report, MEDIUM for verification of specific events). Basurin o Glavnom (Russian milblogger) states children were injured in Kursk Oblast due to a mass drone attack, confirming previous reports and amplifying the civilian impact narrative. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Black Sea / Coastal Areas: ARKHANGEL SPETSNAZA (Russian milblogger) posts an image of a military surface combatant, allegedly targeted by Lancet UAVs, implying Russian anti-ship capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM for claim, LOW for independent verification of incident and target).
• Frontline (General): Russian MoD and General Staff of Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) both publish videos showing drone operations and destruction of enemy hardware/personnel/fortifications. This confirms continued intense tactical engagements across the front, heavily reliant on UAVs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Slivochny Kapriz (Russian milblogger) updates a tactical map for Krasnoarmeysk - Bogdanovka (Donetsk Oblast), indicating continued Russian focus on this axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for report, LOW for impartiality).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations:

• Night operations confirmed in Odesa and Kursk Oblasts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Current conditions remain permissive for aerial, drone, and ground operations. No significant weather impacts reported. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures:

• Ukrainian Forces:
  • Air Defense (AD): Actively engaged against night attacks in Odesa and Kharkiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • General Staff AFU: Emphasizes 24/7 destruction of enemy infantry and equipment on frontline and rear. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • SBU: Releases new footage of "Operation Spiderweb," indicating continued deep strike capabilities against Russian strategic aviation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Management: Providing updates on civilian casualties (Kharkiv) and clarifying power outages (Mykolaiv), as well as reporting on Russian attacks (Odesa). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Morale/Support: Zaporizhia Regional Military Administration promotes IT courses for military personnel and veterans, indicating ongoing social and rehabilitation support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Forces:
  • UAV Operations: MoD Russia publishes videos showcasing drone attacks on "enemy hardware, manpower, and fortifications," reinforcing their reliance on FPV/attack drones. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). "Два майора" (Russian milblogger) promotes the "Bars-Sarmat" Center for Special Purpose Unmanned Systems, emphasizing secure communication for UAV operations, indicating a focus on improving C2 resilience for drone warfare. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for report, MEDIUM for efficacy).
  • Long-Range Strike: Continued use of missiles/UAVs against Odesa (Colonelcassad claim). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for report).
  • Ground Forces: Persistent pressure on the Krasnoarmeysk-Bogdanovka axis (Slivochny Kapriz). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Operations (IO): Russian milbloggers (Colonelcassad, Basurin o Glavnom, Dnevnik Desantnika) continue to disseminate narratives amplifying Ukrainian civilian casualties (Kursk), denying Russian responsibility for civilian damage (Odesa), and promoting Russian military capabilities (Lancets, drone operators). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). Russian state media (TASS, Полиция Хабаровского края) focus on domestic events, projecting stability and civic order, including citizenship ceremonies and economic crime reports (TASS - fraud by fake psychologists). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action:

• Capabilities:
  • Persistent Aerial Terror: Russia maintains capability for multi-vector aerial attacks on urban centers (Kharkiv, Odesa) using UAVs and missiles, causing civilian casualties and infrastructure damage (Mykolaiv/Kherson power outages, albeit not all attributed to kinetic strikes). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Advanced Drone Warfare: Russian forces are actively employing attack drones (FPV) and are focusing on improving their secure communication for UAV operations ("Bars-Sarmat"). This indicates a continued investment in drone technology and tactics. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Information Warfare Integration: Russia continues to synchronize kinetic actions with IO campaigns, including blaming Ukraine for civilian casualties in Russia and attempting to legitimize strikes on Ukrainian cities as targeting "occupied" Russian territory. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Intentions:
  • Degrade Ukrainian Morale and Infrastructure: Continue aerial terror campaigns against urban centers to exhaust Ukrainian AD and break civilian will. The "Molniya" drone type (from previous report) and reported power outages align with this. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Maintain Ground Pressure: Sustain localized ground offensives on key axes (Donetsk: Krasnoarmeysk-Bogdanovka) to attrit Ukrainian forces and gain tactical advantage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Control Narrative & Justify Actions: Intensify IO to blame Ukraine for border attacks (Kursk civilian casualties), legitimize strikes on Ukrainian cities, and project an image of Russian strength and domestic stability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Improve Drone C2: Enhance resilience and effectiveness of UAV operations through better communication systems. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations:

• Focus on UAV C2/ECM: The promotion of "Bars-Sarmat" and its focus on "modern jam-proof communication" indicates an ongoing Russian adaptation to counter Ukrainian EW and improve C2 resilience for their drone swarms. This is a significant development in hybrid warfare. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Persistent Border Area Attacks: Continued kinetic activity in Kursk Oblast (Tetkino, Popovo-Lezhachi) suggests a sustained Russian attempt to maintain pressure and possibly shape conditions for future operations, or retaliate for Ukrainian cross-border strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status:

• Continued drone and missile launches indicate sustained production or acquisition of these munitions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Focus on "Bars-Sarmat" and localized drone production (from previous report) suggests efforts to secure an independent supply chain for key drone components. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• The reported Tambov gunpowder factory fire (previous report) remains a critical factor that could affect Russian munitions supply in the mid-term. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness:

• Russian C2 for strategic and operational-level aerial targeting remains effective, evidenced by continued drone and missile strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian C2 for ground operations continues to direct localized advances and maintain pressure on key axes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian C2 for information operations remains centralized and effective in disseminating consistent narratives, with a strong focus on justifying Russian actions and exploiting civilian casualties for propaganda. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness:

• Air Defense (AD): Ukrainian AD remains actively engaged, responding to persistent Russian aerial attacks on urban centers. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Special Operations/Deep Strike (SBU): "Operation Spiderweb" video highlights continued Ukrainian deep strike capabilities against high-value Russian military targets (strategic aviation). This demonstrates offensive reach and proactive measures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ground Forces: General Staff AFU videos indicate ongoing combat effectiveness in destroying enemy personnel and equipment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Public Information: Promptly reporting civilian casualties and clarifying causes of infrastructure disruptions (Mykolaiv power outage not linked to strikes) to maintain public trust and counter Russian narratives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks:

• Setbacks/Challenges:
  • Continued civilian casualties and infrastructure damage in Kharkiv and Odesa from drone attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Need to manage civilian impact of power outages, even if not directly caused by kinetic strikes, as they can be exploited by Russian propaganda. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Successes:
  • Successful deep strike against Russian strategic aviation targets (SBU "Operation Spiderweb"). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Continued effective AD against persistent Russian aerial attacks. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Proactive and transparent public information efforts regarding civilian casualties and power outages. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
  • Maintenance of social support programs for military personnel (IT courses). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints:

• Air Defense: Persistent, multi-wave nature of Russian drone attacks necessitates an urgent increase in AD munitions and potentially more advanced EW systems, especially those capable of countering enhanced UAVs with improved ECCM. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Long-Range Strike: SBU operations confirm the effectiveness of Ukrainian deep strike capabilities and the continued need for long-range assets and intelligence to identify high-value Russian military-industrial targets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Cyber/EW: The reported internet/mobile outages in Pskov Oblast (Russia) and the Russian focus on jam-proof communication for UAVs ("Bars-Sarmat") highlight the ongoing cyber and EW battle. Ukraine requires continued investment in offensive and defensive EW capabilities. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns:

• Russian Narratives:
  • Victimhood/Justification: Amplifying civilian casualties in Kursk Oblast due to Ukrainian strikes to portray Russia as a victim and justify their own attacks on Ukrainian cities. (Basurin o Glavnom).
  • Denial/Blame-Shifting: Colonelcassad claims Russian Kh-101 missiles are targeting "temporarily occupied" Odesa Oblast, attempting to legitimize strikes on sovereign Ukrainian territory and deny targeting of civilians.
  • Military Superiority: MoD Russia and "Два майора" publish videos showcasing effective drone operations and advancements in jam-proof communication for UAVs, aiming to project technological superiority and demoralize Ukrainian forces.
  • Domestic Stability/Control: TASS and police channels focus on internal events like citizenship ceremonies and economic crime, designed to project a strong, stable government controlling domestic issues and ensuring public safety.
• Ukrainian Counter-Narratives:
  • Documenting War Crimes: Kharkiv ODA and Odesa DSNS immediately report civilian casualties and damage from Russian attacks, reinforcing the narrative of Russian terror and war crimes.
  • Operational Effectiveness: SBU releases footage of "Operation Spiderweb," demonstrating Ukraine's capability to conduct deep strikes against Russian strategic targets, countering narratives of Russian invulnerability.
  • Transparency/Responsibility: Timely clarification of power outages (Mykolaiv, Kherson) helps counter Russian attempts to attribute all infrastructure damage to their strikes and maintain public trust.
  • Resilience & Support: Promotion of IT courses for veterans and military personnel highlights Ukrainian societal resilience and commitment to supporting its defenders.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors:

• Ukrainian Morale: The continuous civilian casualties in Kharkiv and Odesa will test morale. However, transparent reporting, confirmation of Ukrainian deep strikes, and social support programs (IT courses) can help mitigate despair and reinforce agency. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). The temporary power outages in Mykolaiv and Kherson, even if not directly due to Russian strikes, can create anxiety, necessitating rapid restoration and clear communication. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian Morale: Russian propaganda efforts (emphasizing drone capabilities, justifying strikes) aim to bolster domestic morale. However, reports of internet/mobile outages in Pskov and repeated border attacks in Kursk, combined with civilian casualties, could cause anxiety and questions within the Russian populace. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments:

• The intelligence regarding Russian focus on jam-proof UAV communication will reinforce Ukraine's urgent appeals for more advanced AD systems and counter-EW capabilities from international partners. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Ukrainian SBU deep strike operations highlight the need for continued provision of long-range strike capabilities to Ukraine to maintain pressure on Russian military-industrial targets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Russian propaganda leveraging civilian casualties in Kursk for justification and denial of responsibility in Odesa will likely be dismissed by international partners, but may play to domestic audiences. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA):

• Sustained and Potentially More Sophisticated Aerial Bombing of Urban Centers: Russia will continue to employ UAVs and KABs against Kharkiv, Odesa, and other frontline cities. Expect increased focus on improving drone C2 (e.g., jam-proof comms) and potentially incorporating heavier warheads (as noted in the previous report), making attacks more lethal and harder to counter. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Continued Attritional Ground Operations on Donetsk Axis, Focusing on Krasnoarmeysk-Bogdanovka: Russia will maintain high-tempo ground assaults on the Donetsk axis, aiming for incremental territorial gains, supported by heavy use of KABs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Escalated Information Operations (IO) with Hybrid Focus: Russia will intensify IO campaigns focusing on:
  • Propagandizing alleged Ukrainian attacks on Russian civilians (e.g., Kursk children).
  • Promoting Russian military-technological advancements (drone capabilities, C2).
  • Denying responsibility for Ukrainian civilian casualties while blaming Ukraine/West.
  • Attempts to destabilize Ukrainian rear areas through information warfare and small-scale hybrid operations. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Persistent Kinetic Activity in Border Areas: Russia will continue to conduct artillery/drone strikes and potentially small-scale ground incursions in border regions (e.g., Kursk Oblast) in retaliation for Ukrainian deep strikes and to fix Ukrainian forces. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA):

• Coordinated Mass Strike Leveraging Enhanced UAVs & Ground Offensive in a New Direction: Having refined their drone C2 and potentially deployed enhanced "Geran-2" variants, Russia launches a large, coordinated multi-wave strike using these advanced UAVs against critical energy infrastructure or AD sites, synchronized with a major ground offensive on a new axis (e.g., Sumy, as previously discussed). The aim would be to overwhelm defenses and create a strategic breach. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM-HIGH).
• Escalated Hybrid Warfare in NATO Border Regions: While not directly linked to current kinetic activity, Russia could increase hybrid pressure on NATO's eastern flank, potentially through cyberattacks, border provocations, or instrumentalization of migrants, aimed at diverting Western attention and resources from Ukraine. (CONFIDENCE: LOW-MEDIUM).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points:

• Next 1-3 Hours (Immediate Threat): Expect continued Russian tactical aviation activity and potential KAB strikes on Sumy and Donetsk Oblasts. Monitor for follow-on drone activity in Kharkiv and Odesa. CRITICAL: Immediately assess impact of any claimed "Lancet" strikes on Ukrainian naval assets; conduct BDA on any reported "Molniya" drone impact site (from previous report). Decision Point: Maintain highest AD alert for eastern and southern regions; prioritize counter-battery fire against active Russian artillery in border regions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Next 3-6 Hours: Analyze Russian reactions to new SBU "Operation Spiderweb" footage. Monitor for any changes in Russian long-range strike patterns or intensity. CRITICAL: Initiate collection to gather intelligence on "Bars-Sarmat" Center and its jam-proof communication technology. Identify specific vulnerabilities and potential countermeasures. Decision Point: Update AD/EW protocols based on verified Russian drone C2 enhancements; adjust offensive targeting priorities if new Russian military-industrial targets are identified related to drone production/C2. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• Next 6-12 Hours: Evaluate overall Russian operational tempo, specifically observing if any shifts in ground force disposition or aerial strike focus (e.g., from urban terror to critical infrastructure) become apparent. Monitor for any signs of troop buildup or further offensive preparations on the Sumy axis. Decision Point: Reallocate ISR and AD assets based on identified shifts in Russian MLCOA/MDCOA; adjust friendly force posture on vulnerable axes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

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6. RECOMMENDATIONS

• Intelligence & Special Operations (ISR is paramount):

  1. CRITICAL/IMMEDIATE PRIORITY: Dedicate all available SIGINT, ELINT, and HUMINT assets to collect intelligence on the "Bars-Sarmat" Center for Special Purpose Unmanned Systems and its "jam-proof communication" technologies. This is paramount for developing effective countermeasures against enhanced Russian drone C2. (Collection Requirement: Intercepted communications, captured equipment, HUMINT).
  2. HIGH PRIORITY: Continue comprehensive ISR and BDA on the Tambov gunpowder factory strike (from previous report) to fully quantify the strategic impact on Russian munitions production. (Collection Requirement: IMINT, HUMINT).
  3. HIGH PRIORITY: Maintain persistent ISR coverage on the Sumy axis to identify any indicators of a larger Russian ground offensive, including troop concentrations, logistics buildup, or new lines of advance. (Collection Requirement: IMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, HUMINT).
  4. TACTICAL ISR: Continue enhanced tactical ISR to identify and target Russian forces on the Donetsk axis (Krasnoarmeysk-Bogdanovka), particularly where KABs are employed, to direct counter-fire and FPV drone strikes. (Collection Requirement: UAV imagery, forward observers).
  5. IMMEDIATE/NEW PRIORITY: Investigate the reported internet and mobile communication outages in Pskov Oblast, Russia, to determine if they are a result of Ukrainian kinetic or cyber operations, or internal Russian measures. (Collection Requirement: OSINT, SIGINT, Cyber Analysis).
  6. IMMEDIATE/NEW PRIORITY: Conduct forensic analysis on any recovered "Molniya" drone debris from Kharkiv (from previous report) to identify its origin, capabilities, and any potential new threats. (Collection Requirement: TECHINT).

• Air Defense & Force Protection:

  1. CRITICAL/IMMEDIATE: Maintain highest AD alert for Kharkiv and Odesa, given the persistent drone attacks and the claimed advancements in Russian UAV C2. Prioritize allocation of AD munitions, especially for systems effective against UAVs.
  2. URGENT: Based on confirmed Russian UAV C2 upgrades, immediately adapt and disseminate new AD interception tactics and EW countermeasures. Focus on techniques to counter improved jamming resistance and enhance the effectiveness of Ukrainian EW systems.
  3. FORCE PROTECTION (Ground Units): Commanders on the Sumy and Donetsk axes must reinforce engineering and anti-drone defenses against KABs and enhanced UAVs. Disperse forces and implement robust camouflage.
  4. NAVAL ASSETS: Maintain heightened vigilance and defensive posture for all naval assets in the Black Sea and coastal areas, given Russian claims of Lancet effectiveness against surface combatants.

• Ground Forces:

  1. IMMEDIATE: Commanders in Sumy Oblast must remain at a heightened state of readiness, continuously assessing Russian movements and prepared to reinforce or conduct defensive maneuvers. Any commitment of strategic reserves must await verified intelligence on the scale of the Russian offensive.
  2. TACTICAL: Units on the Donetsk axis must continue to maintain robust defenses and conduct targeted counter-attacks, exploiting Russian over-extension or tactical errors. Prioritize the use of precision assets like FPV drones and artillery against high-value enemy targets.
  3. BORDER SECURITY: Reinforce border protection units in Kursk-facing areas with additional counter-drone and counter-artillery capabilities, given persistent kinetic activity and Russian propaganda targeting civilians.

• Information Operations (IO):

  1. CRITICAL/IMMEDIATE: Continue to widely publicize the confirmed civilian casualties and destruction in Kharkiv and Odesa, emphasizing the war crimes and indiscriminate nature of Russian attacks.
  2. URGENT: Aggressively counter Russian propaganda regarding civilian casualties in Kursk Oblast. Provide factual context and highlight Russia's own responsibility for civilian harm.
  3. STRATEGIC: Leverage the successful deep strike against Russian strategic aviation targets (SBU "Operation Spiderweb") as a key strategic success, demonstrating Ukraine's capability to degrade Russia's military assets within its own territory.
  4. COUNTER-DISINFORMATION: Proactively expose Russian narratives blaming Ukraine for attacks on "occupied" Russian territory or attempting to justify their own attacks on civilians. Utilize OSINT to expose their disinformation campaigns.
  5. DOMESTIC IO: Continue clear and timely communication regarding power outages and other infrastructure issues to maintain public trust and counter potential Russian information exploitation.

• Diplomatic & Resource Management:

  1. DIPLOMATIC: Immediately engage with international partners, presenting the escalating civilian impact and the intelligence regarding Russian advancements in UAV C2 and counter-EW. Use this to press for expedited delivery of advanced AD systems, particularly those effective against improved UAVs and EW systems.
  2. STRATEGIC: Advocate for increased international pressure and sanctions specifically targeting Russia's UAV C2 technology and its supply chains, particularly if "Bars-Sarmat" capabilities are verified.
  3. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION: Intensify efforts for international and domestic fundraising for AD munitions and counter-drone technologies, emphasizing the evolving threat.

Previous Report (2025-06-11 07:08:28Z)